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Abstract 
Smallholder farmers in sub-Saharan Africa repeatedly face situations of complex and 
dynamic decision trade-offs, which include allocating money across short-term and 
long-term production activities. Short-term activities such as fertilizer application 
help to cover immediate food needs, but compromise future food production. Long-
term production activities, such as building up soil fertility, are important systemic 
leverage points for future food production, but compromise present-day harvests. 
This article reports a Cournot field experiment conducted with Zambian farmers to 
investigate farm management decision-making in a dynamic context with conflicting 
production objectives. The results revealed that most Zambian smallholder farmers 
were biased towards short-term production activities, which led to suboptimal 
performance in production. Despite this bias, the farmers applied various distinct 
dynamic and non-dynamic decision strategies, with varying production outcomes. 
Simulation experiments with the decision strategies revealed that most decision 
strategies resulted in rather stable production patterns. However, following some 
decision strategies, the production patterns strongly varied when the strategies 
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interacted with other strategies in the same market and the produce was therefore 
subject to the strategies’ endogenous interactions within the market. Given the 
farmers’ strong preference for fertilizer, the findings suggest that a shift towards 
favoring long-term oriented production activities is required to increase food 
production sustainably in sub-Saharan Africa. In conclusion, the various decision 
strategies and their endogenous interactions reinforce the need for building adaptive 
capacity among smallholder farmers in order to apply context-specific decision 
strategies. 
Keywords: Farmers’ decision-making, Zambia, maize production, non-cooperative 
Cournot market experiment, system dynamics 
1. Introduction 
Smallholder farmers in sub-Saharan Africa repeatedly face situations of complex and 
dynamic allocation trade-offs. Should a farmer allocate his or her budget to farm 
activities that immediately increase food production and compromise sustainable 
long-term production? Alternatively, should the farmer allocate his or her budget to 
farm activities that increase food production in the future and tolerate smaller 
harvests today? The answers to these questions are not trivial, for three reasons. First, 
the level of food availability is low in sub-Saharan Africa (GFSI, undated) and the 
immediate need for food may force farmers to focus on short-term production 
objectives (e.g., through fertilizer purchases). Second, food production systems 
“memorize” farm decisions through their resources stocks (e.g., soil organic matter), 
which are an important source of long-term sustainability and resilience (Stave and 
Kopainsky, 2015). Third, the complexity of the trade-off arises from the dynamic and 
interlinked nature of farm decisions: whereas budget allocation decisions are 
restricted to individual farms, the decision outcomes, such as total production, are not 
restricted in the same way. The aggregated production of individual farms affects the 
market price, which in turn has an effect on the farm budget for the next growing 
season and subsequent decisions. Thus, the dynamic nature of such allocation trade-
offs and the dynamic environment of the food production system in Zambia mean 
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that allocation decisions are complex. Additionally, the severity of the decision-
making is indicated in the conflicting benefits of short-term and long-term decision 
alternatives. 
Understanding how farmers decide dynamically (i.e., over time) is of central 
importance to policymakers, agricultural extension officers and food system scholars 
because farm decisions greatly affect food system outcomes, such as food 
availability. Low levels of food availability are an enduring challenge in sub-Saharan 
Africa and even the farmers themselves, who produce the food, are affected by food 
shortages. The disparity between the continuously growing demand for food on the 
one side and lagging production on the other side not only results in low food 
availability, but also depletes the natural resources used in sub-Saharan Africa’s food 
systems (Godfray et al., 2010). Low levels of soil nutrients and soil organic matter, 
unsustainable water usage, and biodiversity losses all threaten the long-term ability to 
provide ecosystem services (Foley et al., 2011). Additionally, climate change is likely 
to cause production losses and yield variability in important crops, such as maize 
(Lobell et al., 2008). This context highlights the urgent need for approaches that 
enhance sustainable food production. 
The literature on sustainable food production approaches is vast and strategic lines of 
action that include increasing resource efficiency and closing yield gaps have been 
summarized; e.g., by Foley et al. (2011). Within these strategic lines of action, soil 
fertility and soil organic matter (SOM) play central roles because they affect 
agricultural productivity in general and resource efficiency in particular (Kumwenda 
et al., 1997). Currently, SOM levels are low in sub-Saharan Africa and thus 
contribute to the big yield gaps. Research has shown that SOM is a systemic leverage 
point to enhance food production sustainably, and that high levels of stocks such as 
SOM have the potential to buffer external shocks (Gerber, 2016; Stave and 
Kopainsky, 2015). However, to increase SOM levels is a long-term process that 
requires consecutive investments. Since many farmers have short survival-oriented 
time horizons, Donovan and Casey (1998, p. 25) argue that smallholder farmers 
“have very high discount rates for future benefits that are far in the future.” 
Consequently, in order to increase short-term food availability, the main focus of 
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public agricultural policies in many countries in sub-Saharan Africa is to increase the 
use of inorganic fertilizers through fertilizer subsidy programs (FSPs) (Banful, 2011; 
Jayne and Rashid, 2013). Whereas fertilizer use in general and FSPs in particular lead 
to higher levels of food production in the short-term, the application of fertilizers fails 
to increase SOM stock levels effectively in the long-rung and therefore fails to 
enhance an important systemic leverage point (Gerber, 2016; Morris et al., 2007). In 
acknowledging this limitation, governments’ and private organizations’ policies have 
focused on conservation agriculture that aims to build up SOM levels. However, 
despite considerable implementation efforts and the plausible potentials, conservation 
agriculture has never played a dominant role to the extent that it could have become a 
real alternative to FSPs (Giller et al., 2009). This reinforces the need for long-term 
strategies and the need for a better understanding of farmers’ decision-making in a 
dynamic context in order to inform policymakers and agricultural extension officers.  
Despite the relevance of understanding farmer’ decision-making in a dynamic 
context, little research has been conducted on sub-Saharan Africa’s smallholder 
farmers’ decisions in general and their decisions about recurrent allocation trade-offs 
in particular (Saldarriaga et al., 2014). Zambia is an exemplary case where food 
availability is chronically low (GFSI, undated). Many technical, political and social 
aspects of the Zambian food system have been intensively researched with the aim of 
increasing food availability: farming practices such as conservation agriculture (e.g., 
Nyanga, 2012; Umar, 2012), policy interventions such as FSPs (e.g., Jayne and 
Rashid, 2013; Mason et al., 2013), and health issues that affect food systems such as 
HIV/AIDS (e.g., Chapoto and Jayne, 2008; Chapoto et al., 2011). However, the 
literature on farmers’ decision-making is restricted to a few topics, such as the 
adoption of technology (Grabowski et al., 2016; Langyintuo and Mungoma, 2008; 
Umar, 2014), identification of household decision-makers (Kalinda et al., 2000), 
production decisions in response to public market interventions (Mason and Jayne, 
2013; Mason et al., 2015; Xu et al., 2009), normative decision modeling (Holden, 
1993; Katongo, 1986), and static farm expenditure decisions (CSO, 2015). Thus, the 
dynamic nature of farm budget allocation to production activities in Zambia and 
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elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa has largely been overlooked in the literature 
published to date. This is especially true in cases where farmers face trade-offs 
between short-term and long-term production objectives. To our knowledge, no study 
has investigated such budget allocation trade-offs in a dynamic context. 
This article contributes to filling the gap in the literature by reporting the application 
of a dynamic, non-cooperative Cournot oligopoly experiment to the case of 
smallholder farms in Zambia. In the experiment, the participants (subjects) iteratively 
decided on how to allocate a given, dynamic budget between two maize production 
activities: fertilizer purchases (a strategy to enhance maize production the short-term) 
and the addition of organic matter to the soil (a strategy to enhance maize production 
in the long run). Unlike other Cournot studies that have mainly contributed to the 
decision literature on a purely theoretical level, we applied a Cournot experiment to 
generate empirical evidence about decision-making based on a field experiment with 
real decision-makers (see Lara-Arango et al., 2017 for conceptual details). A Cournot 
experiment frame allows decision data to be collected in a dynamic, interactive 
context. We contribute to existing literature and policy debates in several ways. First, 
by adapting the standard protocol developed by Huck et al. (2004) to the Zambian 
field setting (i.e., in the absence of a computer network). Second, we corroborated 
previous assumptions that farmers’ decisions are biased towards a short-term strategy 
(fertilizer use) rather than a long-term strategy (soil improvement). Third, formalized 
decision heuristics revealed that some farmers decide dynamically based on farm and 
market information, while others decide on non-dynamic, a priori heuristics. Finally, 
we tested the heuristics in a dynamic simulation model and found that the 
performance of some heuristics depended to a large extent on the endogenous 
interactions with other strategies that are present in the market. Our findings are 
relevant to decision makers and practitioners as a basis for sustainable policy 
formulation. 
The article is structured as follows. In the next section, were describe the 
experimental design and procedures. Thereafter, we present the results of the 
experiments, identify strategies and their heuristics, and analyze the dynamic 
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implications of the heuristics in terms of performance. Finally, we discuss our 
findings and draw conclusions based on the results and analyses. 
2. Experimental design and procedures 
2.1 Experimental design and setup 
We used a semi-computerized experiment based on a Cournot market with non-
standard conditions. The setup included five subjects (players), who were not 
permitted to communicate with one another, in order to avoid collusion. Although our 
experiment was designed on the basis of a traditional Cournot market, our main 
interest was to study decision-making by real farmers in an exploratory field 
experiment (Harrison and List, 2004). Thus, to ensure that the subjects associated the 
experiment with the situation on their farms, our experiment differed from Huck et 
al.’s (2004)1 standard conditions on two structural points (for a detailed discussion of 
the adjustments to the standard protocol, see Lara-Arango et al., 2017). First, we used 
a model that was distinctly larger and richer in technical details than other Cournot 
market experiments (e.g., Arango et al., 2013), in order to make the setting as 
realistic as possible. Second, we considered a dynamic farm endowment, in which the 
current budget was determined by the market price and the subject’s sales in the 
previous round, as was the case on real farms. 
As a starting point, we used a context-specific, economic system dynamics model of 
the Zambian maize market—the maize market model, including its theoretical and 
empirical foundation, which has been described in detail earlier by the first author of 
the present article (Gerber, 2016)—which we adjusted to the experimental setup. The 
main adjustments included constant population, constant arable land area, splitting 
                                            
1 Standard conditions: a. Interaction takes place in fixed groups; b. Interaction is repeated over a 
fixed number of periods; c. Products are perfect substitutes; d. Costs are symmetric; e. There is no 
communication between players; f. Participants have complete information about their own payoff 
functions; g. Participants receive feedback about aggregated supply, the resulting price, and their own 
individual profits; h. The experimental instructions use an economic frame (instructions use 
economic terms such as “firm,” “market,” and “price”) (Huck et al., 2004, p. 106). 
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the production sector into five farms (each managed by one subject), and making soil 
improvement decisions endogenous. Thus, the version of the model used for our 
study differentiated between sectors that were subject-specific (e.g., the farm sector) 
and sectors that were general (e.g., the aggregated market), in which the subjects 
interacted. The parameter values in the study were identical to those in the maize 
market model described earlier (Gerber 2016), which was calibrated to country-
specific data. 
A central construct in the experiment was dynamic farm endowment, in which the 
current budget for subject i 
 (1) 
is determined by the market price , a subject’s production , the share of the 
subject’s production that is sold  in the previous round (since sub-Saharan 
Africa’s smallholder farmers typically self-consume part of their production) and 
, a constant share of the total farm income that is allocated to two production 
activities.  is set at 0.25. In each round, the subjects decide how to allocate the 
given budget  to the two production activities “fertilizer purchase” and “organic 
matter incorporation to the soil” on their farms. The experiment anticipates that the 
total budget is allocated to the activities in the form of fertilizer expenditure 
 and soil improvement expenditure . Soil improvement expenditure 
 affects the subject’s productivity indirectly via SOM and the change of each 
subject’s SOM level , which is defined as 
 (2) 
where  represents the plant residues of the last season’s harvest, which are 
added to the soil as a function of the subject’s yield  and  
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represents the addition of organic matter to the soil. The costs  are set to ZMW2 117 
per lima3. Mineralization is expressed as  and represents the process that 
decomposes SOM and thus reduces SOM levels. The mineralization time  is set 
at 31 years. In the mineralization process, plant nutrients are released, taken up by 
maize plants and contribute to determining yields. The available plant nutrients  
are expressed as 
 (3) 
where  is the fertilizer price,  a subject’s maize production area, and  
is a function that represents the nutrients that are released in the mineralization 
process.  is set at ZMW 550 per 50 kg bag and  is constant at 2 ha for all 
subjects. The available plant nutrients  are eventually taken up by plants and 
transformed into maize yield  expressed in 50 kg bags per year per hectare in the 
following form 
 (4) 
where  is the yield plateau that represents the maximum maize yield under perfect 
factor availability and  is a model specific constant.  is set at 9 tons per ha per year 
and  is set to 4.03. The subject’s i production  is expressed in 50kg bags per 
year and calculated as follows: 
 (5) 
The overall market price is calculated as 
                                            
2 Zambian Kwachas, the local currency. 
3 Lima is a local unit used in the measurement of area; 1 lima ≈ 0.25 ha. 
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 (6) 
where  is a constant scaling factor,  represents the market demand as a 
function of population,  is a price sensitivity parameter set at -0.86 and  
constitutes a reference market price set at 1 ZMW per kg maize. 
To ensure that the model resembled the subjects’ own farms as much as possible, we 
used a more complex version, which comprised additional mechanisms to the key 
equations presented above. The full model, including all equations and 
documentation is presented in Appendix C in this dissertation. An overview of the 
model’s core feedback mechanisms is shown in Figure 1. 
In terms of dynamic decision-making, fertilizer expenditure constitutes a short-term 
strategy to increase yields immediately through fertilizer application and nutrient 
uptake (Figure 1). Soil improvement expenditure represents a long-term strategy that 
increases yields through building up soil organic matter. Although higher yields 
increase a farmer’s budget for the next growing season through increased production, 
sales and farm income (R1 and R2 feedback loops, Figure 1), the increased yields 
also lead to a higher aggregated market supply and thus to a lower price, which in 
turn leads to lower farm income and a lower budget for the next growing season (B1 
feedback loop). In the model show in Figure 1, the B1 loop partly offsets the benefits 
from the R1 and R2 loops through the subjects’ competition. In addition to these 
market-centered mechanisms, the R3 loop adds plant residues to the SOM stock and 
plays a central role in the Zambian maize production system because SOM represents 
a systemic leverage point for increasing food availability and increasing the system’s 
resilience to external shocks, such as changes in rainfall patterns or public policies. 
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Figure 1. Causal loop diagram of the system dynamics model. 
Notes: Arrows indicate causal relationships directed towards the arrowhead. A plus 
(+) at the arrowhead denotes a positive relationship (where the effect variable 
changes in the same direction as the cause variable) and a minus (-) denotes a 
negative causality (where the effect variable changes reversely directed to the cause 
variable). Feedback loops consist of circular chains of causal relationships and are 
either reinforcing processes (which self-reinforce the current behavior) or balancing 
processes (which adjust the behavior towards a goal). R1 – reinforcing soil 
improvement feedback loop; R2 – reinforcing fertilizer feedback loop; R3 – 
reinforcing soil organic matter feedback loop; B1  – balancing supply feedback loop. 
 
The experiment was set to last nine rounds of four years each. In each round, 
decisions were collected and applied for four years in the simulation model. This 
allowed experiments to be conducted within a feasible amount of time and still 
covered a 35-year period, which was long enough for long-term processes such as 
soil dynamics to unfold. As performance indicator in our experiment, we used the 
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subject’s accumulated production over the total experiment duration because 
Zambian smallholder farmers maximize production rather than profits (Umar, 2014): 
 (7) 
2.2 Experimental procedure 
Our experiment followed a standard experimental economics protocol, with 
adjustments to match the rural and cultural context (Huck et al., 2004). The main 
procedural adjustments were semi-computerized interaction with subjects, lack of 
structural transparency about the model’s equations, no information about aggregated 
market supply, and physical rewards instead of monetary incentives (Lara-Arango et 
al., 2017). 
Due to varying degrees of literacy among the subjects, a semi-computerized approach 
was applied, in which experimental instructions were explained verbally in the local 
language following a standardized protocol (Appendix A). Important parameters to 
acquaint the subjects with their “experimental farm” (e.g., farm size and costs 
associated with the decisions) were part of the protocol and were therefore common 
knowledge, including symmetry across firms. Given the model’s complexity and 
given the varying education levels in rural Zambia, we opted not to inform subjects 
about the market’s mathematical representation. To avoid communication during the 
experiment, the subjects were spatially separated. For each decision-time point, the 
subjects received information about the current market price and their own current 
yield, production level and budget before the budget was allocated to the two 
expenditure categories: fertilizer and soil improvement. Because the rural context 
made a fully computerized setting impossible due to the subjects’ low degree of 
familiarity with the use of computers and of outdoor experiments, the information 
was conveyed to them via record sheets (Appendix B) and communicated verbally. 
We opted not to inform the subjects about the aggregate market supply because such 
information is rarely available to Zambian farmers in everyday life. The order of the 
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provided information was altered from round to round to avoid any order-driven bias. 
The subjects’ decisions were noted and the information later entered into a laptop, 
and the simulation-based information was conveyed back to the subjects. After the 
completion of the experiment, a debriefing session helped farmers to reflect on their 
decision strategy and revealed qualitative information about their decisions. Specially 
trained field assistants4 guided the experimental interaction process in the local 
language. The field assistants helped the subjects to understand the provided 
information, but strictly avoided advising the subjects on decisions and revealing 
structural properties of the decision context. 
Prior to the experiment, we incentivized the subjects by presenting five standardized, 
physical rewards that they needed in everyday life,5 and told them that the subject 
with best performing farm could choose a reward first, then the second, and so forth 
until only one reward remained for the last subject. Physical rewards were preferred 
over monetary rewards because of the legal and cultural context. A “game” with 
monetary rewards would probably have been interpreted as gambling, for which we 
would have needed a concession. In addition, such an approach would most likely 
have distracted the subjects' farming mind-set, which we wanted to analyze. 
According to Kelly et al. (2015), rewarding based on the performance position within 
the group acknowledges the subjective normative judgment of different items. The 
subjects were instructed that their farms’ performance would be measured in 
accumulated production (Equation 7). This reflected Zambian smallholder farmers’ 
production objectives, which mainly focus on covering household needs instead of 
profit maximization (Umar, 2014). The duration of the experiment was approximately 
90 minutes. 
The structural and procedural deviations from the standard protocol published by 
Huck et al. (2004) imply that it is not feasible to draw conclusions about the 
                                            
4 The field assistants were local people who were trained in three steps: (1) They took part in the 
experiment as subjects, (2) they made supervised introductions and data collection among 
themselves, and (3) they were supervised and received feedback in the real experimental setting. 
5 2 kg sugar, 1 kg sugar, 750 ml cooking oil, big bar of laundry soap and small bar of laundry soap. 
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rationality of decision-making and thus compare our results with previous studies. 
Instead, our main contribution lies in the analysis of empirical decisions in a dynamic 
context. 
2.3 Subjects 
The experiments were conducted in August 2016, in villages around Mumbwa, in 
Zambia’s Central Province, where the main language spoken is Tonga. The subjects 
were recruited from smallholder farm communities and were either couples or 
widows who ran farms. Thus, all subjects were real decision-makers on farms. 
However, they did not have any previous experience of related experiments. 
A total of 15 experiments were conducted, with 75 subjects, of whom 50 were 
couples and the remaining 25 were single. None of the subjects participated in more 
than one experiment. Through the oral and written communication, we ensured that 
the subjects understood the farm and market information we gave them. The subjects 
were motivated to take part in the experiment and made their decisions carefully. 
Many subjects made calculations on mobile phones or sued pen and paper, or even on 
sandy soil. From the subjects’ reactions during the presentation of the reward items 
and the award ceremony, it was clear that the physical items had motivated the 
subjects to perform well. The reward items were chosen in varying orders (e.g., the 
best performing subject of some experiments chose 2 kg sugar, whereas in other 
experiments the best performing subject chose 750 ml cooking oil). This indicates 
differences in subjective normative judgments of the items. 
2.4 Analysis of decisions 
The subjects formulated decisions on fertilizer and soil improvement expenditure in 
absolute terms, as they would do on their farms in real life. However, the dynamic 
nature of decision-making, which is a key conceptual element in this article, meant 
that it was not possible to compare their decisions in absolute terms. The 
incomparability arose from the dynamic and endogenous interplay between subjects’ 
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decisions; which made one subject’s budget dependent on the other subjects’ 
decisions (Equations 1 and 6). Thus, to make the decisions comparable, we analyzed 
their expenditure relative to their given budget. During the debriefing sessions, some 
subjects even explicitly expressed that their reasoning behind their decisions was 
relative, as reflected in statements such as “we balanced the expenditure between the 
two activities.” Thus, in the following analyses we focus on fertilizer expenditure 
relative to the budget: 
 (8) 
where  is the relative fertilizer expenditure, and the relative expenditure spent 
on soil improvement is the remaining share of the budget. 
3. Results 
3.1 Fertilizer expenditure decisions of the subjects 
We first analyzed the share of the budget allocated to fertilizer and soil improvement, 
respectively, to find out whether there was a clear tendency towards one of the 
options. For this initial analysis, the dataset consisted of 675 decisions resulting from 
15 markets, with 5 subjects in each market, and 9 decision points over the course of 
the experiment. The focus in this section is on the general decision-making patterns 
across all markets and subjects, rather than the results of a detailed analysis of 
individual markets and time-dependent decisions, which we present later.  
The distribution of the 675 decisions is summarized in Figure 2. In 48 cases (7%), the 
decision was to allocate 30% or less of the budget to fertilizer purchases. In 103 cases 
(15%), fertilizer expenditure was between 30% and 60% of the budget, and in 524 
cases (78%), the fertilizer purchases constituted of 60% or more of the budget. This 
indicates that the subjects had a tendency to allocate larger amounts of their budget to 




Figure 2. Distribution of fertilizer decisions. 
To investigate the tendency towards the short-term option further, we analyzed 
whether there was a systematic bias towards fertilizer expenditure. We conducted 
two-tailed Mann-Whitney tests to analyze mean differences for the whole sample, the 
markets and the subjects. The null hypothesis was that the mean relative fertilizer 
expenditure was equal to 0.5, meaning that subjects in the respective groups had no 
bias towards one of the expenditure categories: 
 
The alternative hypothesis was that subjects in the respective groups were biased 
towards one of the expenditure categories: 
 
The results are summarized in Table 1 and they indicate that over the whole sample, 
subjects were significantly biased towards fertilizer expenditure (p value < 0.01). 
Additionally, the analysis of the markets revealed that all 15 individual markets 
showed a significant bias towards fertilizer expenditure (p value < 0.01). 
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Table 1. Summary of the fertilizer allocation decisions per market. Indication about 
bias towards fertilizer is based on Mann-Whitney test. 





M1 0.75 0.240 45 yes *** 
M2 0.69 0.233 45 yes *** 
M3 0.69 0.263 45 yes *** 
M4 0.59 0.319 45 yes *** 
M5 0.73 0.220 45 yes *** 
M6 0.57 0.362 45 yes *** 
M7 0.85 0.133 45 yes *** 
M8 0.71 0.184 45 yes *** 
M9 0.77 0.182 45 yes *** 
M10 0.64 0.253 45 yes *** 
M11 0.84 0.182 45 yes *** 
M12 0.68 0.207 45 yes *** 
M13 0.69 0.134 45 yes *** 
M14 0.74 0.177 45 yes *** 
M15 0.81 0.133 45 yes *** 
Totals 0.72 0.237 675 yes *** 
Notes: a Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, two-tailed; ** p < 0.05, two-tailed; * p < 0.1, two-tailed. 
While the market analysis revealed a clear bias towards fertilizer purchases, the 
Mann-Whitney test of the individual subjects’ decisions revealed a more nuanced 
picture: The mean value of the relative fertilizer expenditure of 60 subjects (80%) 
was significantly higher than 0.5, which indicated a bias towards fertilizer 
expenditure (Table 2). The mean value of the relative fertilizer expenditure of 7 
subjects (9%) was significantly below 0.5, thus indicating a bias towards soil 




Table 2. Distribution of subjects with biases. Each subject appears only once, in the 
category with the lowest applicable p-value. 
Bias p < 0.01 p < 0.05 p < 0.1 Total 
Bias towards fertilizer 53 7 0 60 
Bias towards soil improvement 6 1 0 7 
No bias 8 
Totals 75 
 
3.2 Decision trajectories and benchmark 
To analyze the variation in the subjects’ biases more closely, we investigated the 
decision trajectories. Figure 3 shows the decision trajectories of all subjects within 
the 15 markets and the variation between the subjects’ decision trajectories, and 
between the markets. Unlike other Cournot market-based studies that have analyzed 
subjects’ rationality, we did not focus on theoretical equilibriums based on structural 
transparency, such as the Cournot Nash equilibrium or the competitive equilibrium. 
Instead, we calculated a near-optimal decision pattern using a Powell hill-climbing 
algorithm (Figure 3, top left corner). The resulting benchmark trajectory led to the 
highest accumulated production under the premise that all five subjects stuck to the 
same decision trajectory. Due to endogenous interactions, this benchmark did not 
represent a global optimum. However, it provided the means for comparing the 
empirical decision trajectories. The benchmark revealed that the highest accumulated 
production was achieved if a subject first chose a balanced expenditure strategy that 
slightly prioritized soil improvement to build up SOM stocks (R1 loop, Figure 1) and 
only in the last two rounds allocated the entire budget to fertilizer purchases in order 
to boost short-term production (R2 loop). Thus, theoretically, and from a rationality 
point of view, one could expect “end game behavior” to occur. However, we did not 
expect that to happen because we did not provide structural transparency, which is the 
basis for a fully rational decision-making. Figure 3 reveals that “end game behavior” 










































Figure 4. Trajectories of key variables in the experiment. 
The performance among subjects and markets varied. This variation did not only 
result from individual subject’s decisions but also from the interaction between 
subjects within a market. Figure 4 shows that the model was parameterized such that 
yield and production followed an increasing trend and price drops throughout the 
experiment. All the subjects started with the same initial conditions with regard to 
budget, farm size and costs. However, for the duration of the experiment, the subject-
specific variables production, yield, and budget showed increasing variation. Subjects 
who initially allocated a large share of their budget to soil improvement had smaller 
harvests (production) at the beginning of the experiment than subjects who allocated 
large shares of their budget to fertilizer purchases. This was because building up 
SOM is a slow process with a delayed effect on yields (R1 loop, Figure 1). In the 
model, once the SOM stock levels are built up, the R1 loop drives up yield and 
production. By contrast, subjects who focused on fertilizer purchases built up SOM 
levels mainly through the R3 loop, which was much less effective than R1. As a 
result, fertilizer-centered decisions resulted in lower production towards the end of 
the experiment. Decision trajectories that do not only focus on one of the two 
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alternatives and that even shift the focus throughout the experiment may lead to 
similar overall performance as calculated by Equation 7, despite distinctly different 
patterns. 
3.3 Strategies 
The subjects’ biases towards certain expenditure categories in combination with the 
varying decision and performance patterns revealed in Figure 3 and Figure 4 led us to 
investigate the mechanisms linking decisions and performance further. In the first 
step, we analyzed the subjects’ decisions to identify distinct decision strategies. A 
hierarchical cluster analysis using squared Euclidean distance as a clustering criterion 
was applied in order to group the decision trajectories based on relative fertilizer 
expenditure. The cluster analysis revealed 10 clusters that included between 2 and 16 
subjects each (Figure 5). 
In the second step of the analysis, we linked the clusters to performance. The 
performance of a subject was the result of endogenous interactions within markets, 
and therefore direct comparison between subjects in absolute terms—for example, of 
a subject’s accumulated production (AP)—was limited. To analyze performance 
differences between the strategies, we complemented the absolute concept AP with 
the relative performance concepts “subject’s rank within their market” (rank) and 
“subject’s market share of accumulated production within the market” (relative 
accumulated production, rAP). Table 3 lists the significance levels of the two-tailed 
Mann-Whitney tests, which analyzed whether the means of subjects’ rAP within one 
cluster differed from the means in other clusters. The analysis revealed that the 
majority of clusters differed significantly from each other in terms of performance. 
Clusters that did not reveal a significant difference in means either included a small 
number of subjects (n) or had similar performance outputs following different 
decision strategies. The latter can be explained by model dynamics that, in some 
cases, lead to similar performances, even when different strategies are applied. When 
we used the other performance indicators (rank and AP) for the analysis of means, we 


























































































































































































































Table 3. Number and share of subjects in clusters, performance indicators and 
difference in means of relative accumulated production among clusters (C). 
 
na Share Ranka APa rAPa 
Different means of rAP, 
Mann-Whitney testb 
C1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
C1 4 (5%) 2.3 3447 20.6% 
C2 5 (7%) 1.6 3775 22.2% - 
C3 15 (20%) 3.8 3220 19.2% ** *** 
C4 16 (21%) 4.4 2992 18.0% *** *** *** 
C5 7 (9%) 1.7 3711 21.7% ** - *** *** 
C6 16 (21%) 2.7 3438 20.3% - ** ** *** ** 
C7 4 (5%) 1.0 3933 22.8% ** - *** *** - *** 
C8 2 (3%) 2.0 3578 20.8% - * ** ** - - - 
C9 4 (5%) 2.0 3563 20.9% - - ** *** - - ** - 
C10 2 (3%) 4.5 3116 18.3% - * - - * ** - - - 
Notes: 
a For explanation see Figure 5; 
b significance levels: *** p < 0.01, two-tailed; ** p < 0.05, two-tailed; * p < 0.1, two-tailed. 
The analysis of the number of subjects within the clusters revealed that successful 
clusters (rank  2; C2, C5, C7–9) included fewer subjects (n = 2–7, 22 subjects in 
total), who on average allocated 50% of their budget to fertilizer purchases. Clusters 
with an average rank higher than 2 (C1, C3, C4, C6, C10) included more subjects (n= 
2–16, 53 subjects in total), who allocated on average 81% of their budget to fertilizer 
purchases. Thus, few subjects chose a successful long-term strategy (soil 
improvement) compared to many subjects who focused on a short-term oriented 
strategy (fertilizer purchase) that performed worse. The successful clusters all 
revealed strategies that put more weight on soil improvement than on fertilizer 
purchases at one point in time. In this way, the subjects built up their SOM stocks and 
performed well, even if they applied a fertilizer-centered strategy (e.g., towards the 
end of the experiment, as in the case of cluster 5). Subjects in the less successful 
clusters predominately focused on fertilizer expenditure and thus neglected to build 
up SOM levels. 
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3.4 Heuristics 
Since the subject’s choice of decision strategy would have performance implications, 
we investigated the decision rules within the different strategies (clusters) and 
formulated each cluster’s specific heuristic. In this context, we use the term 
“heuristic” to describe a mathematical decision rule that was based on the information 
provided to the subjects prior to the decisions. A heuristic thus represents a rule of 
thumb to describe how subjects made their decisions. Research has shown that linear 
models of decision-making often provide good representations of underlying 
processes (Gary and Wood, 2011). In the absence of prior information about Zambian 
farmers’ decision rules in the context of short-term and long-term production 
decisions, we applied a linear regression model to estimate the decision rule for each 
subject: 
 (9) 
where  is a subject-specific constant and  is the subject-specific regression 
parameters. We included all information cues that were presented to the subjects on 
the record sheet prior to each decision (price, production, yield and budget; see 
Appendix B). For each subject, we conducted a linear regression and obtained the 
subject-specific intercept  and information weights  that specified the subject’s 
heuristic according to Equation 9. The heuristics captured the majority of the variance 
in subjects’ decisions with a mean R square value of 0.69. 
Based on the subject-specific heuristics, we formed the aggregated heuristics of the 
different clusters. Accordingly, for each cluster, we calculated the strategy’s specific 
heuristic by averaging the regression coefficient of its subjects. As a result, a cluster’s 
heuristic was structured in the form of Equation 9, with parameter  as the cluster’s 
intercept and  as the respective information weights (Table 4).  
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Table 4. Heuristics identified in the clusters (C). 
 
Relative fertilizer expenditure heuristicsa 
nb Rankb APb rAPb 
Price Production Yield Budget Intercept 
C1 0.0117 0.0507 -0.2857 -0.0008 -0.0106 4 2.3 3447 20.6% 
C2 0.0144 0.0041 -0.0026 -0.0001 -0.6703 5 1.6 3775 22.2% 
C3 0.0279 0.0291 -0.0344 -0.0008 -1.6187 15 3.8 3220 19.2% 
C4 -0.0038 0.0017 -0.0087 0.0003 0.6826 16 4.4 2992 18.0% 
C5 -0.0465 -0.0353 0.0845 0.0013 3.5714 7 1.7 3711 21.7% 
C6 0.0057 0.0046 -0.0007 -0.0006 0.9218 16 2.7 3438 20.3% 
C7 -0.0341 -0.0056 -0.0590 -0.0003 3.8432 4 1.0 3933 22.8% 
C8 0.0088 0.0056 0.0023 -0.0013 1.0445 2 2.0 3578 20.8% 
C9 0.0100 0.0199 -0.1390 -0.0009 1.0280 4 2.0 3563 20.9% 
C10 0.0317 0.0466 -0.1314 -0.0015 -1.2520 2 4.5 3116 18.3% 
Notes: 
a Mean information weights for the decision heuristics; 
b For explanation see Figure 5. 
Our interpretation of the heuristic’s coefficients was not trivial. Some of the clusters 
included only a small number of subjects and were therefore limited in terms of 
coefficient validity. In addition, the absolute comparability of clusters was limited 
because the strategies originated from market-specific, endogenous interactions 
among the subjects. Moreover, the different information cues had different numerical 
ranges. In our interpretation of Table 4, we therefore mainly focus on the overall 
results and the relative strength of information weights within information cues and 
the algebraic signs of information weights between information cues. 
In Table 4, most of the budget information weights have a negative algebraic sign, 
which indicates that most decision strategies allocated smaller shares of the budgets 
to fertilizer purchases if the budgets increased (except for clusters 4 and 5). The 
information weights of price and production have the same algebraic sign (except for 
cluster 4), whereas the information weight of yield has the reverse algebraic sign 
(compared to price and production, except for cluster 7). The interpretation of the 
reverse algebraic signs of production and yield is difficult, because production is a 
linear function of yield with a positive multiplier (Equation 5). Explanatory 
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hypotheses can be derived from the subjects’ remarks in the debriefing sessions. 
Some subjects indicated that, through the experiments, they had learned to 
differentiate between the two concepts “yield” and “production”. Thus, if that was 
true for the majority of subjects, they might not have completely understood the 
positive correlation of the concepts and therefore they might have given reverse 
weights. Another point commonly made in the debriefing sessions was that the 
subjects had learned about the importance of dynamic bookkeeping. Thus, they many 
not have been used to applying dynamic heuristics based on farm-specific and 
market-specific information. 
To investigate these hypotheses and to understand the heuristics better, we analyzed 
individual clusters. In the following, we highlight selected clusters that we found 
particularly interesting and that included more than 5 subjects—clusters 3–6. In 
clusters 3–6, cluster 4 performed worst on all performance indicators (rank, AP and 
rAP). Compared with the other three clusters, all information weights were relatively 
close to zero in cluster 4, which indicates that subjects within this cluster made 
decisions without giving much attention to the development of farm and market 
information. In addition, Figure 5 shows cluster 4 as strongly biased towards fertilizer 
purchases. Thus, cluster 4 followed a non-dynamic, a priori defined fertilizer strategy, 
which one of its subjects summarized by saying: “fertilizer works. We spent large 
shares of the budget to fertilizer purchases and didn’t care about the other option.” 
This supports the hypothesis above, that subjects in cluster 4 did not base their 
decisions on dynamic farm and market information. 
Cluster 6 was similar to cluster 4, in that of no weight was assigned to farm and 
market information. However, Figure 5 shows that the subjects of cluster 6 applied a 
strategy of balanced expenditure with a moderate bias towards fertilizer purchases. 
This resulted in an average production that outperformed the low production of 
cluster 4. This finding also supports the hypothesis that farmers do not decide based 
on dynamic farm and market information. The subjects of cluster 6 expressed that 
they balanced their expenditures between the two production activities. 
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Of the remaining two clusters, one was among the most successful with regard to 
performance (cluster 5) and the other was among the least successful clusters 
(cluster 3). Both clusters gave relatively high weights to the provided farm and 
market information. However, the algebraic signs differed for all the weights. The 
successful subjects in cluster 5 started with comparatively low fertilizer expenditures, 
which means that they initially focused on the long-term strategy (soil improvement). 
Then, the subjects of cluster 5 decided adaptively, i.e., dynamically, based on the 
development of the information cues. By contrast, the subjects in cluster 3 started 
with relatively high fertilizer expenditures and increased the share of fertilizer 
expenditures even further, based on their dynamic decisions strategies. Thus, they 
even amplified their bias towards fertilizer expenditure. For both cluster 3 and 
cluster 5, which applied dynamic heuristics based on the provided farm and market 
information, we were not able to find explanations for the reverse algebraic sign of 
the information weights for yield and production, other than the hypothesis that the 
subjects might not have completely understood the positive correlation of the 
concepts. However, both clusters applied dynamic heuristics based on the provided 
farm and market information, but revealed highly significant differences in their 
performance indicators (Table 3). 
3.5 Robustness of heuristics 
The formation and analysis of the heuristics described above happened under the 
premise that the underlying data were the result of dynamic interactions among the 
subjects within the respective markets. Especially the heuristics of clusters with few 
subjects may have been biased due to the endogenous nature of the experiment. To 
test for robustness, we performed simulations with the heuristics presented in Table 4. 
Instead of the subjects making the decisions (as in the experiments), we implemented 
the heuristics into the simulation model and ran it for each cluster. By applying the 
same heuristic for all five farms, we tested how the heuristics worked in isolation. 
Figure 6 shows that the heuristics in Table 4 and their performance implications are 
robust to the experiments’ endogenous interactions in most cases. In most of the 
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clusters, the simulated allocation decisions were very similar to the average decision 
trajectories from the experiments. Also, the simulated accumulated production per 
subject (APsim) was very close to the AP in most cases (the difference was less than 
3%). Only clusters 5 and 7 revealed larger differences in decision trajectories and 
performance. While the simulated patterns of decision trajectories still showed an 
increasing trend (as the empirical trajectories), the increase was exaggerated in the 
simulation. This exaggerated the bias towards fertilizer and resulted in APsim 9% 
below AP in both cases. The exaggeration of the bias happened because the heuristics 
highly weighted price development. When the strategies used by subjects in clusters 5 
and 7 were applied in combination with other strategies, they performed well 
(Table 4). However, their exclusive appearance in a market created endogenous 
interactions that led to a suboptimal output, because high production resulted in price 
decreases that triggered a shift towards a fertilizer-centered strategy. This indicates 
that, in some cases, the composition of strategies within a market matters for a 
strategy’s performance. 
To test the effect of strategy composition within a market, we conducted further 
simulations with combinations of selected heuristics. The results indicated that 
heuristics, which led to decision patterns similar to the subjects’ empirical decision 
means shown in Figure 6, showed little variance in production, even with varying 
strategy compositions (e.g., heuristic 4 in Figure 7). However, the heuristics of 
clusters 5 and 7 that showed divergence from empiric pattern means in Figure 6, also 
revealed varying production patterns, depending on the strategy composition within 
the market (e.g., heuristic 5 in Figure 7). Thus, the performance of heuristics 5 and 7 
was strongly influenced by endogenous interactions with other subjects, which was 


































































































































Figure 7. Simulated production of heuristic 4 (H4) and heuristic 5 (H5) in varying 
combinations. 
Note: APsim – average accumulated production of the cluster’s subjects based on 
simulation. 
4. Discussion and conclusions 
Smallholder farmers in sub-Saharan Africa repeatedly face situations of complex and 
dynamic budget allocation trade-offs between short-term and long-term production 
activities. Short-term activities, such as fertilizer application, help to cover immediate 
food needs, but they compromise future production. Long-term production activities, 
such as improving depleted soils, enhance future food production, but compromise 
current harvests. While regenerating depleted soils is an important leverage point for 
increasing long-term food availability, this is not a current practice. Increasing food 
demands will place pressure on food production systems, which will mean that soil 
regeneration will be unlikely to happen. We investigated Zambian smallholder 
farmers’ decisions that governed long-term soil regeneration by using a semi-
computerized, non-cooperative Cournot field experiment. In the experiment, the 
farmers (i.e., the subjects) aimed to maximize their maize production by repeatedly 
allocating a given budget to two maize production activities: fertilizer purchases 
(representing a short-term production strategy) and soil improvement (representing a 
long-term production strategy). Our results provided empirical evidence, based on the 
decisions of real farmers, that helped to understand the dynamic decision-making of 
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smallholder farmers in Zambia. In the following sections, we discuss our key 
findings, their implications, and the potential for further research. 
4.1 Bias towards fertilizer use 
The results showed that, overall, the subjects had a strong and significant bias 
towards decisions that were effective in the short-run but decreased food system 
outcomes and their resilience in the long-run (fertilizer purchase). While these 
findings are consistent with Donovan and Casey's (1998) hypothesis that smallholder 
farmers had high discount rates for benefits that would be realized far in the future, 
our results provided empirical evidence in support of this hypothesis. The findings 
have both theoretical and practical implications. First, the distinct bias towards short-
term strategies could be an explanatory hypothesis for why long-term policies, such 
as the dissemination of conservation agriculture, are difficult to scale up (Giller et al., 
2009). Whereas short-term policies, such as fertilizer subsidy programs (FSPs), are in 
accordance with the farmers’ mind-sets, long-term polices are not. Second, given the 
potential of long-term strategies to increase production, resilience, and sustainability, 
it would be crucial to scale up long-term strategies (Gerber, 2016; Stave and 
Kopainsky, 2015). Thus, to scale up long-term oriented strategies, a shift in farmers’ 
decision-making is required, for example through agricultural extension (consultancy 
for farmers). However, it is not straightforward what the shift in mind-set should 
include and how it could be achieved. The following findings may help in this 
respect. 
4.2 Variation in decision strategies 
Besides the clear overall bias towards short-term production activities, we found great 
variability in the farmers’ decision patterns. A non-negligible number of subjects 
either clearly prioritized the regeneration of soil organic matter (SOM) over short-
term benefits or had no bias towards one of the expenditure categories. To analyze 
this variation, we structured the decision patterns into 10 clusters, each of which 
represented a distinct decision strategy. The number of subjects within the clusters 
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varied. Especially the clusters that performed best in terms of production comprised a 
small number of subjects and at least at one point during the experiment focused on 
improving soil fertility. Clusters that performed worse included the majority of 
subjects and were centered on fertilizer purchases.  
4.3 Decision dynamics and success factors 
To investigate the link between decisions and performance further, we developed 
heuristics for each cluster in the form of mathematical decision rules based on the 
information cues that were provided to the subjects prior to them making their 
decisions. The analysis of the clusters’ heuristics revealed that some heuristics that 
covered the majority of subjects were rather insensitive to the provided farm and 
market information and thus did not take into account the dynamics of the food 
production system. The performance of those “non-dynamic heuristics” varied and 
depended on a priori decision rules, which we were not able to detect due to the study 
design. The closer the non-dynamic heuristics were to the decision benchmark 
(Figure 3), the better the heuristics performed. However, some subjects reacted to the 
provided information and made their decisions in response to the dynamic context. 
The performance of such “dynamic heuristics” also varied. Heuristics that started 
with low fertilizer expenditures and dynamically shifted in their focus towards higher 
fertilizer expenditure were most successful in terms of production. Dynamic 
heuristics that started and remained with high fertilizer expenditure shares were less 
successful in terms of production. Heuristics that started with high shares of fertilizer 
expenditure but showed a decreasing trend over the experiment’s duration led to a 
medium performance because the SOM stocks were built up too late to have an 
impact in the experiment. Thus, we found both, dynamic and non-dynamic heuristics, 
and both groups had varying performances. 
Deciding dynamically alone does not guarantee success. Instead, we found two 
preconditions or drivers of success for dynamic heuristics that resulted in above-
average performance in terms of production. First, the most successful subjects 
initially focused on replenishing SOM stocks before reaping the short-term benefits 
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from the application of inorganic fertilizer. This criterion was necessary to trigger the 
food production system’s long-term leverage point. Second, successful subjects 
dynamically adjusted their decisions based on farm and economic information. This 
criterion was necessary but not sufficient to achieve a good performance. Subjects 
who adjusted their decisions dynamically did not perform better than other subjects, 
unless they prioritized soil organic matter replenishment at the outset. Thus, dynamic 
adjustment is only beneficial if the first condition is met. 
4.4 Dynamic interaction of decision strategies 
We further analyzed how the heuristics performed in terms of production if they were 
part of markets with varying combinations of different heuristics. Most of the 
heuristics revealed stable production patterns, even when the composition of 
heuristics within the market varied. Thus, the majority of the heuristics were robust to 
the endogenous interactions between different decision strategies within the markets. 
However, we found that two heuristics reacted strongly to market signs (prices) and 
that were sensitive to the interactions between decision strategies. The production 
pattern of those two heuristics largely depended on the other decision strategies that 
were present in the market. For example, accumulated production was rather low 
when all five farms applied the same heuristic. However, if these heuristics were part 
of markets that embraced a mix of decision strategies, they had the potential to lead to 
top performances in terms of production. This indicates that the performance of 
heuristics that place a strong emphasis on price information will be strongly 
influenced by dynamic and endogenous interactions within the respective markets. 
4.5 Practical implications 
Overall, a shift in mind-set towards favoring long-term production activities is needed 
to increase sub-Saharan Africa’s food production sustainably. Our findings revealed 
relevant information for agricultural extension, which in practice may facilitate such a 
shift. The observed variation in decision strategies means that there may not be a 
single solution for all cases. Instead, agricultural extension should design 
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interventions with the potential and flexibility to take into account diverse decision 
strategies within a group of farmers. In that way, agricultural extension could build 
on current practices instead of introducing radical paradigms or, in some cases, 
completely new ones. 
The two drivers of success have further implications for practice. The first driver of 
success—initially prioritizing the replenishment of SOM stocks—takes considerable 
time to increase production substantially. This creates a severe conflict with the need 
to secure short-term benefits (immediate food needs) through the use of inorganic 
fertilizer. Thus, an important prerequisite for implementing a strategy designed to 
replenish SOM might be to explicitly combine it with the application of inorganic 
fertilizer in order to reduce the trade-off between short-term and long-term objectives 
(Kearney et al., 2012). 
Concerning the second driver of success, the dynamic adjustment of decisions, our 
data show that it is quite uncommon for farmers to adjust their decisions dynamically 
to economic information, such as prices. However, Spicer reports that in-depth 
interviews with smallholder farmers in Zambia revealed that they were very capable 
of adjusting their decisions dynamically in other domains (Spicer, 2015). For 
example, farmers used agronomic information that enabled them to decide about 
biological production aspects, such as crop rotation. The implementation of the 
second driver of success can thus build on what farmers already do, which is to adjust 
their decisions dynamically based on agronomic information, and use this for 
comparison when making decisions that need to include economic information. 
Another challenge for implementing the second driver of success arises from the 
endogenous interactions between decision strategies within a market. Our analysis 
revealed that the performance of some dynamic heuristics was dependent on the 
composition of the heuristics within the markets. Such interaction-sensitive heuristics 
may be attractive to individual farmers because they are successful in terms of 
production if other farmers choose other, less successful strategies. However, from a 
broader perspective, dynamic heuristics that are sensitive to endogenous interaction 
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bear the risk of performing below their potential. Thus, alternative heuristics that 
have a slightly lower maximal production potential but react less sensitively to 
endogenous interactions might be preferable. These insights further highlight the 
need for context-specific extension services, and in general it should be emphasized 
that there is no universal optimal way for smallholder farmers to make and 
dynamically adjust decisions. This reinforces the need for building adaptive capacity 
rather than promoting the broadest possible diffusion of technical training.  
4.6 Further research 
Findings from experimental studies are not conclusive in the sense that they originate 
from a laboratory environment and not from a real-world context. The external 
validity of experiment-based findings is thus a common concern and ultimately needs 
empirical confirmation based on real world data. However, previous research has 
shown that the external validity of experimental findings allows for some 
generalization (e.g., Anderson et al., 1999) and we believe that our experimental 
setup, which was as close as possible to the subjects’ situation on their respective 
farms contributed to the potential for external validity of our findings. In particular, 
the use of a complex model that included time delays and feedback processes, and 
that was calibrated using data from Zambia, allowed us to mimic farmers’ real-world 
decision tradeoffs. The external validity of our findings is further supported by the 
field experiment setting, in which real farmers were subjects (Lara-Arango et al., 
2017). 
Although we have revealed insights into the dynamic decision-making of sub-
Saharan Africa’s smallholder farmers in the context of short-term and long-term 
production activities with conflicting objectives, there are several ways in which our 
findings could be expanded and complemented. We found that some of the subjects 
decided on a priori heuristics that we could not explain with our study design. 
However, to develop agricultural extension towards long-term production activities, 
knowledge of the foundation of a priori heuristics might be useful. Our study design 
could be enriched by individual, semi-structured interviews with all subjects after the 
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completion of the experiment. Such interviews would allow qualitative information 
about the a priori heuristics to be gathered, but might also be a means to explore why 
even dynamic heuristics reveal reverse algebraic signs for the information weights of 
yield and production.  
Further research should address the process of decision-making. Our subjects 
consisted of couples and single players, and exploratory analysis of our data revealed 
that neither their performance nor their decision about strategy was affected by these 
facts. However, couples mentioned in the debriefing sessions that they were not used 
to decide together. Thus, investigating on-farm decision processes with regard to 
performance might both inform agricultural extension about key decision persons and 
be useful for evaluating the external validity of the findings. In sum, our results 
provide important evidence of dynamic decision-making by farmers to enhance food 
availability sustainably in sub-Saharan Africa and serve as a steppingstone for further 
research in this field. 
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Appendix A: Data Gathering Protocol 
1. Gather the participants (5 couples, that in real life each actually run a farm 
together). 
2. Introduction and Instructions: Hello and welcome everybody.  
Introduction of all that are present 
A. Purpose 
Thank you for being here. Today we gather information for learning how you make 
different decisions. Andreas is doing a schoolwork study for his PhD in collaboration 
with Dr. Nyanga at UNZA6. He is interested in learning how you make decisions as 
couples. The information will be used for academic purposes and may be published in 
academic journals. Is that clear and ok for you? 
B. Roles 
We would like to gather the information through playing a game together. The roles 
are: I am the moderator, who will interact with you. Andreas is the computer man, 
who will be putting the information in the computer and giving the results. Cain and 
Eukeria will help me moderating the process, transmitting information between you 
and the computer man. You, the couples, are the players who make decisions. 
C. Game 
Every couple will manage a farm. You all have a common main goal for your farm. 
In this game the main goal is to maximize your accumulated maize production over 
the whole game. To reach the goal of maximize your production, you must decide 
how much money (Kwachas) you want to spend on two options. The first option is 
buying own fertilizer (not through government or NGO subsidies). And the second 
option is spending financial means to improve your soil through crop residue 
retention and manure application. In this game we just have these two options and we 
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are not considering other options such as lime application, crop rotation, Musangu 
tree plantation, etc. 
Here is some information to understand your farm: Each couple cultivates 8 limas 
(equivalent to 2 hectares) of maize on its farm, so your decisions are limited to this 
area. The maize yield level is currently around 7 bags of 50kg per lima; the 
current/starting production therefore is around 60 bags of 50kg per farming season. 
The current/starting producer price of maize at your market is around 75 Kwacha per 
50kg bag. 
In the beginning your budget for the two options is 1392 Kwacha. In the first option, 
which is buying fertilizer, a 50 kg bag of fertilizer cost 550 Kwacha. In the second 
option, which is crop residue retention and manure application, a lima costs you 117 
Kwacha, adding external organic matter becomes more expensive. 
For you to make decisions, the moderator will come to you and give you information 
about your budget, yield, current production and market price. You will then decide 
how much of the budget you want to spend on fertilizer and how much you want to 
spend to improve your soils. The moderator will take note of your decision and bring 
it to Andreas. He will put your decision into the computer and calculate the new 
budget, yield, production and price. The moderator will bring this new information 
back to you so that you can again decide how much money you will spend for 
fertilizers and soil improvement. We will have 9 rounds in this game. Thus, these 
dynamics will continue until we complete 9 periods (you make 9 decisions). The 
game will be completed in 1-2 hours approximately. 
At the end of the game, the computer calculates your total production for the entire 
game and you will be rewarded with a present depending on your results. We brought 
a couple of items of which the best performing couple can choose one item first, the 
second best performing couple second, etc. 
Show the goods (2kg sugar, 1kg sugar, 750ml oil, big laundry soap, small laundry 
soap) 
If you have difficulties to make your decision, think of how you decide on your own, 
real farm and always keep in mind that your goal is to maximize your production! 
 181 
We will have the possibility to clarify procedural questions during the game, but not 
ask for help in decision making. So far, is the game clear to you? Are you willing to 
participate? If you do not want to participate or feel uncomfortable, you can 
withdraw. 
Remarks to the instructor: 
It is ok to clarify procedural questions: e.g., what happens after we make a decision? 
Do we have to spend the entire budget to these two policies? Etc. 
It is also ok to clarify the meaning of words (e.g., yield) 
Do not give clues that may directly influence the decision making process. E.g., do 
not answer questions regarding what should be done such as “should I allocate more 
on fertilizers?” or  “How can I make the highest production in the game?” 
3. Split the participants up. 
In this game it is the idea that you keep your decisions and results as a secret within 
your farm and do not share them with the other couples. So please, keep 
communication between the farms at a low level. However, once the game is finished 
and we have all the results from everyone, you are very free to share experiences and 
strategies with each other! 
Give your best and good luck!! 
4. Start the actual rounds. 
After first round: explain that yield, production, price and budget changes. Costs stay 
the same. 
5. Save the rounds. 
Take a copy (soft or hard) from the interaction sheets and save it. 
Give a hard copy to the farmers as a feedback. 
6. Conclude with an aftermath session. 
At this point the game is over and you are free to leave if you wish. However, if you 
appreciate, we will have a feedback session explaining some ideas of the game. 
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Appendix B: Record Sheet 
Farm Number:________          Data Collection Set-Nr:___ 




Round Yield Production Price Budget Soil Fertilizer 







 Price Yield Production Budget Soil Fertilizer 
1       
 
 Production Price Yield Budget Soil Fertilizer 
2       
 
 Yield Production Price Budget Soil Fertilizer 
3       
 
 Price Yield Production Budget Soil Fertilizer 
4       
 
 Production Price Yield Budget Soil Fertilizer 
5       
 
 Yield Production Price Budget Soil Fertilizer 
6       
 
 Price Yield Production Budget Soil Fertilizer 
7       
 
 Production Price Yield Budget Soil Fertilizer 
8       
 
 Yield Production Price Budget Total Production 
9     
 
  




- 50 kg Fertilizer costs 550 ZMW 
- 1 lima improved soil costs 117 
ZMW, for further improvement the 
price increases 
